Romania holds a strong structural position in Central and Eastern Europe’s gas market, with domestic production covering most of its demand and a balanced energy mix. However, it has not yet established a clear regional role, according to energy analyst Aura Săbăduș, who notes that the country is not fully leveraging its potential despite having assisted Moldova through several Russia-triggered energy crises since 2021. At the same time, four new natural gas transit routes are emerging in the region.
“I would say that Romania is probably in one of the most fortunate positions in Central and Eastern Europe. It is also fortunate in that it has enough gas to cover most of its domestic demand”, she said said at the “International Approach London” conference, organized by Energynomics in London. Unfortunately, what we lack is a regional vision. We are too timid, too shy to articulate a clear role for ourselves in the region. What role do we want to play? Let’s be honest: if it hadn’t been for Romania, Moldova would not have survived the three crises created by Russia since 2021. It simply would not have survived, and that applies to both gas and electricity. Yet we are not talking about it. We are not capitalizing on our potential. We have enormous potential. We have sufficiently high demand, good reserves and a very balanced energy mix. But we do not know how to capture that potential”, she said.
Her assessment comes against the backdrop of the reconfiguration of European gas flows. Since 2022, Russia has reduced around 80% of its gas supplies to Europe. Currently, the only remaining route for Russian gas into the European Union runs via Turkey to Bulgaria and onward to Serbia and Hungary. All other traditional corridors have been shut, and from 2027, EU regulation foresees a full phase-out of Russian pipeline gas imports.
As a result, gas flows that historically moved from east to west have reversed, and all the gas is coming now from west to east, as new supply corridors develop across Central and Eastern Europe. The region, home to approximately 160 million people, currently consumes between 95 and 100 billion cubic meters (bcm) of gas per year. Demand is expected to increase due to coal-to-gas switching and potential reconstruction needs in Ukraine. Ukraine alone imported around 5 bcm last year. In a post-war scenario, Săbăduș says, gas demand could rise significantly.
New transit opportunities
Săbăduș says that four major supply routes are currently taking shape in Central and Eastern Europe. The first is the Germany-Austria-Ukraine axis, along which significant volumes of gas are being pushed from west to east. Ukraine, she argues, is starting to become a kind of absorption hub for these flows, as infrastructure upgrades allow gas to be redirected to other markets in the region. The second is the Balkan corridor, where Russian gas is still flowing along the Turkey-Bulgaria-Serbia-Hungary route. Looking ahead, however, Turkey’s role could increase significantly. The country currently operates five LNG terminals and plans to build two more and it has substantial capacity and is also an important gas producer in its own right.
A third emerging corridor links Denmark, Finland, Poland, and Ukraine. Săbăduș says she was surprised to discover Denmark’s interest in becoming a transit route for Norwegian North Sea gas to Ukraine and Moldova. Danish authorities and companies are actively courting these markets as destinations for Nordic gas entering Central Europe. The fourth is the so-called vertical corridor, built around the former Trans-Balkan pipeline. Traditionally, it transported Russian gas southward to Greece, but flows have now been reversed: gas enters from Greece and is shipped through Bulgaria, Romania, and Moldova to Ukraine.
Romania is currently the largest gas producer in the European Union, with output expected to increase further, particularly as Black Sea projects advance toward 2027. In addition to production, Romania is a transit country for regional flows. However, Săbăduș argues that the country has not sufficiently articulated what role it intends to play in the evolving regional system.
A central issue is the absence of a liquid regional gas market. Central and Eastern Europe comprises several landlocked countries dependent on LNG imports that must transit multiple jurisdictions. This leads to “tariff pancaking,” where cumulative transmission charges significantly increase costs. Săbăduș argues that Romania is well positioned geographically to host such a market, given its production base and interconnections. In contrast, price spreads across Central and Eastern Europe remain wide compared with Western Europe, where markets are more closely integrated. Transmission tariffs remain a sensitive issue. According to Sabadus, parts of the Trans-Balkan system, particularly in Romania and Moldova, apply relatively high transit fees. Although Transgaz has introduced temporary 50% discounts, these measures are set to expire.
Infrastructure operators are reevaluating their commercial strategies. For example, Transgaz, would like higher transit tariffs, but complex market dynamics complicate this approach: higher fees could discourage capacity bookings, while lower tariffs might attract additional volumes. On the other hand, as regional competition intensified, Poland reduced tariffs, contributing to increased LNG inflows via terminals in Poland and Lithuania and facilitating onward deliveries into Central and Eastern Europe.
Romania, for its part, has significant underutilized infrastructure, while competition for regional gas flows is intensifying. The United States has actively promoted LNG exports to the region, including deliveries through the Greek terminals at Alexandroupolis and Revithoussa, with onward transit toward Ukraine. Turkey, which has substantial import and regasification capacity and is also a gas producer, is likewise positioning itself as a major regional supplier. As additional capacity comes online, competition among transit routes and supply sources is expected to increase further.
“It is very important for Romania to understand not only the intrinsic value it has because of its geographical position, but also what it could offer the region. Unfortunately, no country in Central and Eastern Europe has succeeded in building a truly liquid gas market in an environment where many landlocked countries need access to LNG. If you bring LNG through Poland, for example, it must then transit Ukraine, Hungary or Slovakia. In Romania’s case, if you bring LNG from Greece to Ukraine, it has to pass through five countries. This is what we call ‘tariff pancaking,’ and it is extremely expensive. If there were a liquid market in Romania, companies could simply purchase gas there and ship it to wherever it is needed, reducing transit costs. For that reason, Romania is probably one of the best-positioned countries in the region to develop such a market and allow investors and companies to secure gas locally, rather than importing it through Greece and transiting it across multiple jurisdictions”, she added.
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In several Central and Eastern European countries, end-consumer gas prices remain among the highest in Europe, despite relatively moderate wholesale prices, largely due to taxes, levies and regulated charges added along the supply chain, an issue Aura Săbăduș says has received limited public scrutiny.
Against a backdrop of mounting geopolitical risks, energy security has moved to the top of the policy agenda. The assumption that Europe was structurally competitive due to access to cheap Russian gas has been fundamentally challenged since 2022. After Russia curtailed supplies and prices surged, the European Union spent an estimated €800 billion to shield companies and households from the impact of the energy crisis.
The conference “International Approach London” was organized by Energynomics, with the support of the Embassy of Romania to the UK and the British Embassy in Romania, together with our partners: AJ BRAND, Electrica, Monsson, MyEnerji, Nofar Energy, Waldevar.