This analysis examines recent geopolitical developments in Venezuela and Iran in the context of structural transformations in the global oil market. The study begins with the premise that the pressures and interventions exerted by the United States in these two regions cannot be understood solely in regional or security terms, but must be viewed within the framework of a broader strategy to influence the international energy architecture. In this light, the competition concerns not only access to oil reserves, but also control over logistics infrastructure, transport routes, and the mechanisms through which prices are formed on the global market. Thus, the dynamics in Latin America and the Middle East become relevant for understanding a broader systemic confrontation, in which energy functions simultaneously as a strategic resource, an instrument of power, and a vector for the reconfiguration of the global order.
Mihai Melintei, Energy Analytical Studies
Structural changes in the oil market
The modern model of the international oil market took shape in the late 1980s and early 1990s, with the institutionalization of a dual trading architecture based on the interdependence between the spot market and the futures market. This structure enabled the formation of a complex price-setting mechanism, in which the balance between supply and demand is complemented by expectations regarding future developments in economic and geopolitical variables. The development of international exchanges such as the Intercontinental Exchange, the New York Mercantile Exchange, and the Dubai Mercantile Exchange has contributed to the consolidation of the international oil market, transforming crude oil into a strategic asset of global systemic relevance.
At the same time, price assessment agencies such as S&P Global Platts and Argus have become key players in determining benchmark crude oil prices, ensuring transparency and standardization in a trading environment characterized by volatility and cross-border interdependencies.
Currently, we can observe that the global oil market is undergoing a phase of structural transformation, marked by the diminishing traditional regulatory capacity of the Organization of the Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC), the fragmentation of trade flows and supply chains, and the repositioning of major Asian consumers, particularly China and India, which are investing in alternative logistics infrastructure and autonomous payment mechanisms. The imbalances between the spot and futures segments of the oil market reflect not only trade tensions but also geopolitical adjustments.
In this context, the United States’ energy strategy takes on new systemic dimensions. The policy of “energy dominance” promoted by the Donald Trump administration aims to strengthen domestic hydrocarbon production and expand influence over global energy flows. From the perspective of energy assets, we can observe that the U.S. is adopting a long-term stance, suggesting a strategy to promote its own benchmark WTI, and to downplay OPEC’s traditional role in market stabilization.
U.S. Geopolitical Involvement in Latin America and the Middle East
The geopolitical dimension of U.S. interests in energy assets becomes evident in relation to oil-producing countries in Latin America and the Middle East. Thus, military developments in Venezuela and Iran can be interpreted as part of the competition for control over strategic energy resources and routes at the international level.
From a geopolitical perspective, we can conclude that the United States’ primary objective in Venezuela was not so much to control the trade in Venezuelan oil, but rather to place the oil projects in Venezuela’s Orinoco Belt under direct U.S. administration or indirect U.S. corporate control. In this context, it should be noted that Venezuela holds the world’s largest proven oil reserves, estimated at over 300 billion barrels.
As a result of its control over oil projects in Venezuela and other oil projects worldwide, the U.S. would come to influence 40% of total global oil production, approximately 40 million barrels per day. This would mean that approximately half of the world’s oil reserves would be under U.S. control.
At the same time, it should be noted that, prior to the United States’ military intervention in Venezuela, China was the main importer of Venezuelan oil. Over 60% of oil production was destined for export to China. This energy relationship has been strengthened over the past decade through significant investments by Chinese companies in Venezuela’s oil sector and through financing agreements backed by oil deliveries at reduced prices. Under these circumstances, the reconfiguration of control over oil projects in Venezuela can be interpreted not only as an attempt to expand Washington’s energy influence, but also as an action with strategic implications for China, limiting its access to preferential oil resources and reducing Beijing’s ability to use Venezuela as an energy supply source.
Another step in the implementation of the U.S.’s long-term strategy regarding energy assets was the launch of a military operation, alongside Israel, against Iran on February 28. In terms of proven crude oil reserves, Iran ranks third globally, which gives it significant structural potential to influence the balance of the global oil market. At the same time, its geographical position in the Persian Gulf makes Iran a major energy hub in the Middle East, located near one of the world’s most important energy transport routes – the Strait of Hormuz.
In particular, the Strait of Hormuz is a critical chokepoint for global energy security, through which approximately 27% of the world’s oil flows and a significant proportion of liquefied natural gas shipments pass. Disruption of this energy corridor, as a result of military developments in the region, triggers immediate price adjustments, as oil markets already factor in risk premiums associated with regional instability in the Middle East. Currently, the oil market has lost between 1.5 and 2 million barrels per day, and the withdrawal of additional volumes from the market would push oil prices higher.
At the same time, Iran’s importance stems not only from the size of its oil reserves, but also from the structure of the energy trade relationships it has developed in recent years. Despite sanctions regimes and geopolitical pressures, Iranian oil exports have been significantly redirected toward Asian markets, particularly China. Trade data indicates that approximately 90% of Iran’s oil exports are directed toward the Chinese market, making this relationship a key pillar of bilateral energy cooperation. For Beijing, Iranian oil represents a stable source of supply, often traded at preferential prices, while for Tehran, the Chinese market constitutes the main channel for monetizing energy resources under the restrictions imposed by the Western financial system. This aspect gives the military confrontations between the U.S. and Iran a systemic dimension that extends beyond the regional framework.
In 2025, 17% of China’s oil imports came from Iran and Venezuela. Another 30% of imports came from Saudi Arabia, Iraq, Oman, the UAE, and Kuwait, which rely on the Strait of Hormuz. China imported over 5 million barrels of crude oil per day through the Strait of Hormuz in 2025. In total, more than half of China’s crude oil imports come from countries that are now facing trade disruptions.
Under these circumstances, military developments in Iran have repercussions that extend beyond the regional context, indirectly affecting China’s energy security as well. Given that the Chinese economy relies to a significant extent on oil imports from countries subject to sanctions or located in regions of instability (often traded at preferential prices), restricting access to these energy flows can be interpreted as part of a broader strategic dynamic, whereby U.S. actions simultaneously target Iran’s oil export capacity and seek to limit its economic capacity, including by reducing the energy advantages enjoyed by China.
Conclusions and Historical Parallels
The conclusion drawn from an analysis of recent developments in the oil market suggests that the global energy system is at a new historical turning point, comparable in some respects to the transformations that followed the 1973 oil crisis. At that time, the embargo imposed by Arab states led to a profound restructuring of the mechanisms governing the oil market, accelerating the transfer of power from major Western oil companies to the producing states united within the Organization of the Petroleum Exporting Countries. That period marked the end of the dominance exercised by the corporate cartel known as the “Seven Sisters” and the beginning of a new phase characterized by the consolidation of the energy sovereignty of the producing states.
Currently, geopolitical developments in the Middle East and Latin America suggest the emergence of a reverse process of reconfiguration of power relations within the global energy system. While in the 1970s oil-producing nations succeeded in limiting the influence of Western oil companies, current trends point to a possible shift in the oil market’s center of gravity toward the financial and institutional infrastructure dominated by the United States. In this sense, the consolidation of the WTI benchmark and control over large oil reserves can be interpreted as elements of a broader strategy to influence international energy mechanisms.
However, this transformation does not replicate the classic model of dominance exercised by the “Seven Sisters” group. In the postwar period, control of the oil market was achieved through direct ownership of oil concessions, vertical integration of the value chain, and unilateral price setting via the “posted prices” system. Currently, most of the world’s oil reserves are managed by national companies, such as Saudi Aramco, the National Iranian Oil Company, ADNOC, PDVSA, Rosneft, etc., and the sovereignty of producing states over energy resources remains much stronger than in the past.
However, certain contemporary developments suggest the emergence of an adapted form of systemic influence. Unlike the historical model of the “Seven Sisters,” energy dominance is no longer exercised exclusively through direct control of reserves, but through influence over logistics infrastructure, financial markets, and the institutions that set global price benchmarks. In this sense, competition for control over pricing mechanisms becomes just as important as access to physical resources. The actor that succeeds in placing energy companies in certain countries under its administration or “corporate participation” gains access to resources and the ability to influence logistics flows – a scenario already realized by the U.S. in Venezuela.
The current reshaping of the oil market reflects the transition toward a more complex and competitive global energy system, in which geopolitics, economics, and logistics infrastructure are becoming interdependent elements of the international power structure. Just as the 1973 oil crisis marked the end of the “Seven Sisters” cartel’s dominance over oil resources, current developments may signal the beginning of a new phase, characterized by competition for control over the institutional mechanisms governing the global energy market. Thus, we can formulate the following hypothesis: the center of global oil pricing and strategic decision-making may shift from OPEC to the U.S., which will lead to a reconfiguration of trade and logistics chains. In such a context, disruptions in energy transportation and intensified competition for resources will continue to put pressure on oil prices, particularly in the Asian market, amplifying the interdependence between energy security and global geopolitical rivalries.