At least 119 MW will reach the end of their green certificate (GC) support in 2025, with over 500 MW following in 2026. The process is predictable and was anticipated, but the consequences are only now becoming operational: for many projects, the transition to the post-GC era means changing the revenue model—from “support” to contracting, optimization, and risk management. The stakes for the market are how portfolios are repositioned and what happens to bankability, investment appetite (including repowering), and commercial discipline in production.
2025: A wave with an absolute leader
The data in the Transelectrica file allows for the aggregation of an installed capacity associated with the outputs from the support scheme of at least 119 MW in 2025. The result should be read as the “observable minimum,” as there are records where the PI (installed capacity) is reported as 0 or missing, even though the unit exists and is operational.
The latest report published by Transelectrica shows 40 units whose accreditation will expire in 2025. The analysis shows that beyond the rows in the table, we are talking about 33 distinct generation units and 32 economic agents involved. The number of units shows how widespread the phenomenon is; the capacity in MW tells us where the economic impact will be. Therefore, although there are many hydro/micro-hydro power plants, the economic weight is concentrated in a small group of projects, especially wind farms.
The seven largest units for which support has expired account for over 117 MW of the total approximately 119 MW of installed capacity “visible” in the data. The largest asset is CEE Peștera (90 MW, EDPR Romania), followed by CEE Mireasa 2 (10 MW, Eco Power Wind). In the same set, but at a distance, are the biomass power plant in Stejaru (6.5 MW, General Energetic), CEE Baia 2 (5 MW, East Wind Farm), and CEE Topolog 2 (3 MW, Electrawinds Chimconsult). In the hydro area, there are MHC Bâlea (2 MW, Forum Development) and CHEMP Bolovanu (0.914 MW, Energo Bis MHC). The rest of the units on the list are much smaller in terms of power or reported with zero installed power in the Transelectrica file.
2025 ended with a warning: several years of accelerated learning lie ahead for some renewable asset owners. The disappearance of green certificate revenues will not shut down the plant, but it may completely change the way production is monetized.
2026: Critical mass and increased concentration
In 2026, exits from the support scheme will exceed 500 MW. The list includes 82 items, representing 73 separate generation units and 53 economic agents involved. This year, wind power clearly dominates in terms of installed MW, and the concentration is extreme: the top four units leaving the scheme account for 289 MW (i.e., more than half of the capacity associated with expiries). The top 10 parks (each with a minimum of 10 MW) account for 423 MW of the total that will remain without direct support through green certificates. These are expected to generate the most commercial decisions, renegotiations, and repositioning. The real pressure will be felt at their level, in terms of contracting, profile optimization, aggregation, trading, and operational performance.
However, the expiration schedule leaves a window of preparation until Q4 for the five largest parks that will exit the green certificate scheme this year. The largest asset is CEE Mihai Viteazu IV (80 MW, Premier Wind 80 – exit Dec. 31, 2026), followed by CEE Sălbatica 1 (70 MW, PPC Renewables Romania – exit Dec. 31, 2026) and CEE Sălbatica 2 (70 MW, PPC Renewables Romania – exit Oct. 30, 2026), then CEE Cernavodă 2 (69 MW, EDPR Romania – exit Oct. 30, 2026) and CEE Dorobanțu (45 MW, East Wind Farm – exit Sept. 30, 2026). Next, in order of installed capacity, are CEE Valea Nucarilor 3 (34 MW, PPC Renewables Romania) and CEE Siliștea 1 (25 MW, Veroniki Wind), and the 10 MW threshold is occupied by CEE Topliceni (10 MW, Energy Tech Entera), CEE Baia 4 (10 MW, East Wind Farm) and CEE Grebanu (10 MW, Energy Tech Entera). The rest of the units that expire in 2026 are much smaller in power or appear in relation to PI=0, which makes the total of 503 MW, again, a minimum accountable in the data set, not necessarily a complete picture of the actual capacity that will transition to post-support.
The peak will be reached in 2027–2028
But 2026 is just the beginning – the maximum share of exits from the green certificate support scheme will be reached in 2027–2028. Based on aggregate data (generation units and reported installed capacity), the 2025–2031 curve shows that exits from the scheme are concentrated in 2028, both in terms of number of units and total capacity. Beyond individual situations, at the market level we will see how a significant segment of “mature” renewables will face unprecedented pressure.
The differences between the two graphs are as important as their common shape. The unit graph suggests a broad “wave,” with many assets leaving the support scheme within a short period. On the other hand, the capacity chart immediately shows that not all projects are equal; together, the years 2027–2028 account for about 70% of the MW that will lose support through green certificates by 2031. In the peak years, not only will many projects be affected, but also large installed capacities. We can anticipate that the market will experience the transition as a regime change for large capacities that matter in contracting, price exposure, and revenue stability.
Overall, the graphs describe an inevitable rebalancing: support does not disappear “overnight” for the entire portfolio, but neither does it fade gradually and evenly. It retreats in waves, and the dominant wave is large enough to change behaviors. It is not the support mechanism that should catch our attention, but the way or ways in which a significant segment of renewable production will have to prove its viability.
2026 includes the final months in which a significant portion of mature renewables can prepare for the highest level of commercial and operational competitiveness they have ever experienced.
What does the post-green certificate strategy look like?
Situations differ from case to case, and response strategies will not necessarily be the same, but there are a few things we can anticipate for the market and for companies.
- More pressure on contracting: PPAs, portfolio products, hedging—all are becoming “basic” tools, not options.
- The growing role of aggregators and traders: once out of the CV, assets will seek profile optimization, better access to markets, and management of imbalances.
- O&M and technical availability become “money”: when support disappears, every percentage point of availability and every poorly planned shutdown is immediately reflected in the margin.
- Recalibration of bankability and financing: projects will be evaluated more strictly on price risk and cash flow robustness; opportunities for refinancing, consolidation, and, in particular, repowering where it makes economic sense are also emerging.
- Indirect effects for consumers: not directly through “easing the scheme,” but through how these capacities will behave on the market—more exposure to volatility and, potentially, a more “professional” market in contracting and risk management, except in situations where some assets prove unviable, excessively costly to revive, or unable to overcome new conditions (environmental, but not only) that have arisen in the meantime.
The expiration of the green certificate support scheme does not mean the end of production or the disappearance of several GW of generation capacity, but rather a change in the economic rules by which they operate. And if we have not learned what this transition looks like by 2025 and 2026, 2027–2028 are the years when the market will force us to do it on a large scale.
