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Benjamin Schmitt: The Vertical Corridor should go beyond gas

    16 November 2026
    Interviews
    Gabriel Avăcăriței

    The Atlantic Council’s new research on the Vertical Corridor calls for closer integration of gas infrastructure, electricity networks, and power generation, alongside stronger protection of critical energy assets. Dr. Benjamin L. Schmitt discusses Romania’s strategic position, the prospects for Neptun Deep, the commercial obstacles facing the corridor, and the implications of recent US-Russia energy developments for European security.

     

    Dr. Benjamin L. Schmitt, Senior Fellow at the University of Pennsylvania Department of Physics and Astronomy, Perry World House, and the Kleinman Center for Energy Policy, is coauthor, together with Uliana Certan, of the Atlantic Council report A new vision for the Vertical Corridor: European energy security through infrastructure optimization.

    The report examines the infrastructure, market, and security challenges facing the countries along the Vertical Corridor and was featured in the Atlantic Council session organised in Bucharest on November 16, 2026.

     

    European integration has always involved more than common institutions and regulations. How does the Vertical Corridor fit into the longer history of building Europe’s energy infrastructure and strengthening its political and economic cohesion?

    Since the emergence of the European continent from the collective trauma of World War II, European leaders have often spoken of a vision of the need to engage in the “building of Europe” as a common rhetorical construction.

    In reality, it is clear that the European project has not only required the conscious “building” of governance and regulatory structures at both the nation-state and supranational levels to foster quasi-theoretical concepts of shared political identity and cross-border cohesion.

    Indeed, the building of Europe has also consistently been a practical one, from the sharing of energy and industrial materials via the European Coal and Steel Community to the physical construction of energy infrastructure and related installations aimed at better integrating Western Europe as a functional economic bloc under the US-backed Marshall Plan and European programs that followed.

    The strategy extends to the European Union’s work over the past two decades to build critical energy diversification infrastructure to reduce the Russian Federation’s ability to weaponize energy, especially by better integrating the historical east-west energy flows present through legacy Soviet pipelines with north-south and south-north interconnectors.

    Investment steps for the deployment of physical energy infrastructure, and related cross-border regulatory actions, have allowed three decades of growing integration and economic success among those nations that escaped the Soviet yoke more than three decades ago.

    Clearly, these investments have paid dividends to better bind European nations from west to east; however, the project remains in progress, with the Vertical Corridor a primary area of current focus.

     

    The Vertical Corridor has so far been developed primarily as a natural gas initiative. Should its scope be expanded, and what would a broader regional energy security platform involve?

    It seems clear that the scope of the Vertical Corridor should broaden beyond the current sole focus on gas infrastructure to create a cross-sector energy security platform.

    Infrastructure development should continue to focus on creating security-of-supply diversification sources of energy and delivery routes, with a particular prioritization of those interconnections, compressor upgrades, power lines, storage gaps, and power production facilities that will help alleviate current cross-border discontinuities and bottlenecks.

     

    Romania occupies a central position along the corridor and is preparing for additional gas production from Neptun Deep. What infrastructure priorities should the country pursue, and how should it balance commercial utilization with energy security?

    Energy infrastructure development along the Vertical Corridor is a requirement to construct cross-border infrastructure that can link regions and nations for the first time, but this infrastructure must also alleviate existing bottlenecks that are hindering the implementation of a well-functioning energy market across the region.

    For Romania, a nation with arguably one of the most central positions along the corridor, this means continuing to optimize and upgrade its internal gas transmission network, while ensuring cross-border interconnections are upgraded to allow export of upcoming Neptun Deep gas volumes to support regional energy security and replacement of Russian gas volumes.

    To this end, export to Ukraine could be a significant option, allowing this gas to reach Ukraine’s strategic underground gas storage facilities.

    Likewise, it needs to be recognized that even if some regional infrastructure is intermittently underutilized, the Vertical Corridor concept prioritizes energy security, meaning that Romanian optionality for gas production as well as transit from the south remains a national security necessity.

     

    Beyond infrastructure development and market integration, physical security has become an increasingly urgent concern. How serious are the threats facing energy infrastructure along the Vertical Corridor, particularly in Romania and the Black Sea region?

    Beyond infrastructure development, regulatory, and market economics, a more insidious threat has also reemerged: namely physical threats to energy and critical infrastructure.

    Once thought to be an anachronism relegated to the dustbin of history and overshadowed by cyber threats, physical sabotage and shadow warfare against European civil infrastructure have returned to the continent for the first time at scale since World War II.

    This includes brazen Russian clandestine sabotage campaigns targeting civilian energy infrastructure, as well as drone and rocket incursions into NATO airspace near critical infrastructure facilities across the continent, all with increasing regularity since Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine in 2022.

    In the Vertical Corridor region, the scale and scope of physical threats to energy and critical infrastructure remain high, including for Romania, given the ever-increasing scourge of Russia-backed sabotage incidents, drone overflights, and offshore drone strikes that continue to menace infrastructure and shipping along the Black Sea littoral region.

    And one cannot overlook the apex version of Russian energy weaponization toward Europe: the Kremlin’s tragic, ongoing, and overt kinetic strikes against civilian targets across Ukraine, including energy infrastructure destruction intended to foment energy poverty and misery for the citizens of this war-torn nation.

     

    The corridor has gained physical capacity, but its commercial competitiveness remains constrained. What regulatory and tariff reforms are needed to make it a viable route for regional gas trade, particularly toward Ukraine?

    Beyond infrastructure, gas transmission system operators along the Vertical Corridor should continue to work on the coordinated reduction and harmonization of regulations, tariffs, and capacity allocations to support the commercial competitiveness of the route, which has previously suffered from the cumulation of tariffs referred to as “tariff pancaking.”

    Regulatory fragmentation across the Vertical Corridor region continues to be an impediment that must be overcome to ensure the proper technical and economic functionality of the route.

    In the natural gas sector, further cross-border discussion must lead to the harmonization of gas quality regulations, which can help overcome bottlenecks to flowing gas internationally.

    Additionally, issues related to the tariff economics of the route need to continue to be addressed closely.

    For example, from the perspective of Ukraine, which hosts the largest strategic underground gas storage facilities along the route, despite the energy security optionality provided by the Vertical Corridor, the cumulation of tariffs as gas transits several nations northward can lead to concerns about the economics of the route when gas flows longer distances.

    The Vertical Corridor nations need to work to eliminate this phenomenon of tariff pancaking along the route, which can support competition with transit routes entering Ukraine featuring the imposition of fewer cross-border tariffs, such as LNG imported into Poland and transited to Ukraine.

    While officials and operators along the route may remind consumers that these tariffs are needed to support the construction of diversification infrastructure along the route, these projects should be further supported through, for example, EU funding via vehicles like the Connecting Europe Facility and related infrastructure development programs.

     

    The European Union has established a timetable for phasing out Russian natural gas. What measures are needed to prevent Russian gas from re-entering the European market through third countries or alternative trading arrangements?

    At a strategic level, Russian gas should continue to be eliminated from the energy mix along the Vertical Corridor in line with European mandates to end imports of Russian LNG by January 1, 2027, and of Russian pipeline gas by November 1, 2027, at the latest.

    This effort must include robust gas production screening and know-your-customer oversight to ensure that Russian gas imported by non-EU nations cannot simply enter the bloc under a whitewashed identity.

    The Vertical Corridor continues to build out infrastructure investments and make regulatory advancements that aim to ensure both security of supply and a robust market economy across Southeast Europe, and must comply with these EU mandates to end Russian gas imports.

    Despite this clear-cut set of deadlines, the potential for suppliers outside of the EU and offtakers within the EU to attempt to circumvent their implementation remains a growing concern.

    This especially pertains to import-control restrictions that the EU has put in place to ensure that schemes such as the Turkish Gas Hub cannot enable Russian gas imported into Turkey to be simply re-exported into the EU with claims that the gas is, in fact, Turkish.

    In response, the European Union passed Regulation (EU) 2026/261 in February 2026, which included provisions on origin screening to ensure that Russian gas is kept out of the EU to the greatest extent possible.

    This includes regulatory oversight at the Strandzha 1 gas interconnection between Turkey and Bulgaria, where entities attempting to transit volumes of gas into the EU will be screened to ensure they are not introducing Russian gas to the system.

    The regulation also aims to ensure that gas transiting the Russian Federation is excluded, as well as LNG originating from Russian “shadow fleet” vessel schemes.

    Ensuring that these Russian gas import loopholes remain shut will take rigorous enforcement and oversight both at the EU and member state level, and should be supported by increasing the capacity of sanctions and technology export controls personnel across EU jurisdictions.

     

    Recent US-Russia energy developments have raised questions about the consistency of transatlantic policy toward Moscow. How do you assess the Trump administration’s recent initiatives, and what response is needed from European and US policymakers?

    Finally, it would be disingenuous not to acknowledge the deterioration of support for Europe’s energy security associated with recent Russian energy “deals” reportedly being pursued by the Trump administration.

    Europe and the United States should resist any movement away from sanctions and technology export-control measures that have been put in place against the Russian Federation.

    In parallel, US policymakers should continue their messaging and legislative actions that would reinforce transatlantic consensus on maintaining sanctions pressure on Putin’s Kremlin.

    Last month saw an “October surprise” of 2026, as a sudden surge of Trump administration announcements regarding new energy “deals” with Putin’s Kremlin and reports of other energy cooperation agreements between the United States and the Russian Federation.

    Among other initiatives, these include: the “Russian Diesel Deal” for the import of Russian diesel fuel to the United States in an attempt to bring down diesel costs ahead of the US midterm elections; the waiver of sanctions, tariffs, restrictions, and duties related to the Lindsey O. Graham Sanctioning Russia and Iran Act of 2026 that was already passed on a broadly bipartisan basis and signed into law by President Trump in September 2026; reports of diplomatic talks between the United States and Russia that would press for a resumption of Russian gas sales to Europe, including through a restored set of Nord Stream pipelines in the Baltic Sea; and reports of lobbying of the US Department of the Treasury to enable the import of sanctioned LNG export infrastructure from Russia’s Novatek to support the development of an Alaskan LNG export terminal that was revealed to have been backed by Novatek itself, resulting in the resignation of the venture’s American executives.

    Reacting to these US-led developments, European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen on October 21, 2026, unequivocally stated that the European Union will not go along with the waiver of any Russian energy sanctions.

    On the US side, outrage at these pivots by the Trump administration to support Russian energy has led to bipartisan statements from seven US senators stressing the dangers of these moves, hinting at potential legal challenges to come. In the US House of Representatives, several Democrats and Republicans vowed to push for a full implementation of the Russia sanctions codified in the Graham Act.

    Amid reports of Russian diesel tankers en route to the United States to offload cargoes as a part of the Trump diesel deal, a bipartisan coalition of lawmakers in both houses of Congress began sending letters warning US port authorities, banks, and potential offtakers of the potential questions of legality of importing Russian diesel cargoes, and hinting at further oversight to come through the request of these entities to retain any and all documents related to any potential import of the Russian fuel.

    As of mid-November 2026, these initial bipartisan congressional efforts appear to have succeeded, as reports have emerged that several diesel tankers carrying the Russian fuel toward the United States have been diverted to other global offtakers.

    The “diesel deal” ultimately had domestic impacts in the Russian Federation as well, as reporting has focused on a growing shortage of diesel volumes available to consumers in the St. Petersburg region as a result of the hasty export of these volumes to the United States.

    These are prudent and proactive steps, and regardless of the balance of power across Capitol Hill in 2027, bipartisan actions need to continue to statutorily halt any ongoing push by the White House to weaken energy restrictions on the Russian Federation, which persistently engages in overt kinetic warfare against Ukraine and clandestine sabotage and drone attacks against critical infrastructure across the remainder of Europe, including the Vertical Corridor region.

    Autor: Gabriel Avăcăriței

    Gabriel Avăcăriței is a journalist and communicator with over a decade of experience in Romania’s energy sector. Since 2013, he has been Editor-in-Chief of Energynomics, the country’s leading B2B communication platform for the energy industry. He moderates all Energynomics conferences and debates, bringing clarity and depth to discussions among policymakers, business leaders, and innovators. Under his leadership, Energynomics has evolved into the most comprehensive editorial project in Romania’s energy field, combining a news website, quarterly magazine, and a wide portfolio of industry events that inform and connect the energy community.

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