The order in which Romania built its security after 1990 is thinning. In this context, the Smart Energy Association (AEI) has conducted a study called Energy Analysis of Romania in a Context of Geopolitical Insecurity and Withdrawal of External Guarantees. From Energy Security to Energy Autonomy, Romania’s Strategic Break in a Post-Globalization World, says Dumitru Chisăliță, President of AEI.
The analysis starts from a political hypothesis: The US National Security Strategy (November 2025) would mark the transition from the role of “omnipresent guarantor” to a tough selection of interests, in which protection is conditioned by the partners’ capacities to manage their own risks. If this premise is correct, then the consequence for Romania is direct: the status of passive beneficiary of security becomes unstable, and our strategic value will be measured less in declarations and more in the capacity for action.
In this framework, energy is moved from the economic register to the security register. Not because the price of energy is the only determinant of power, but because energy fuels the continuity of the state: industry, transport, health, communications, public order, defense. A state can remain formally sovereign and yet be vulnerable if, in a crisis, it cannot provide electricity, heat and fuels. The analysis states, without reserve, that in the 21st century state failure can occur by blocking critical systems, not necessarily by invasion.
Globalization has allowed a model of energy security based on interconnected markets, “always available” imports, commercial diversification and price optimization.
In a context of competition between great powers (as is being foreshadowed), resources are used as a weapon – the fragmentation of markets and the risk of disruptions (including hybrid attacks) – makes the current security model insufficient, because it falsely assumes that “access to energy remains guaranteed”.
Therefore, the AEI analysis supports the need to move to a more complex form of energy independence – “energy autonomy”: not autarchy and not isolation, but the ability to cover critical peak and crisis consumption from truly controllable resources and infrastructures (production, networks, stocks, flexibility). In practice, “security” no longer means “I have where to buy”, but “I can function if I can’t buy”.
In this paradigm, dependence on imports and spot markets is no longer just an economic choice, but can become a strategic vulnerability in times of crisis.
From here, three possible trajectories for Romania in 2025–2035 are derived:
Scenario A – Energy autonomy as self-support in times of stress, not as isolation. Its essence is simple: sufficient domestic production during peak times, balanced electricity mix (stable sources supplemented by integrated renewables without destabilizing the system), redundant and protected networks, strategic stocks managed on risk criteria, not momentary optimization. In this logic, energy becomes an instrument of sovereignty: it reduces blackmail, stabilizes costs, supports competitiveness and, crucially, allows the functioning of military and administrative capacities without major external constraints. The secondary, but strategic, benefit is regional positioning: Romania could offer limited support to its neighbors and would become a provider of stability, not just its consumer.
Scenario B is the opposite of scenario A, purchasing imported energy at peak consumption, exclusively commercial stocks. In this picture, energy is no longer just expensive; it becomes scarce. Rationalizations, disruptions, harsh prioritizations appear. Prices rise sharply, the economy comes under stress, the budget chokes on compensations, and society fragments under the pressure of perceived inequity and misinformation. The central strategic consequence is the degradation of defense: higher operational costs, affected logistics. In an unstable region, this is not a sectoral problem, but a national security risk.
Scenario C, the “gray zone”, is the most seductive and dangerous scenario: enough functioning of the energy systems to not seem urgent, enough vulnerability to cost constantly. Seasonal imports managed ad hoc, strategic projects blocked (hydro, gas extraction, etc.) or pushed forward without a time horizon, partially modernized networks, reactive interventions and caps that temporarily calm but do not structurally repair. Romania remains in a regime of managed improvisation: it does not collapse, but it does not gain freedom of movement either. It becomes dependent on the “wind of geopolitics”. Romania finds itself in this dangerous situation today.
From these scenarios, the AEI analysis draws an operational conclusion: an energy doctrine is needed, that is, a set of security priorities that dominate the strict market logic when the stakes are the continuity of supply and the interests of the state. The principles are clear: energy as part of defense; independence measured at peak consumption; priority for domestic production in crisis; networks as critical infrastructure; storage as security assurance; gas as transition flexibility; nuclear as an anchor in system security; efficiency as a “source” that reduces vulnerability without adding dependencies.
The hardest point of the AEI Analysis is, however, another one, the fact that energy autonomy without minimum technological autonomy is an apparent autonomy. If equipment, maintenance, software, parts and know-how remain imported, then supply chain blockages can produce the same effects as an energy outage. Therefore, the analysis calls for an industrial shift: Romania to become an integrator and producer of critical subsystems, not just an importer, through long-term contracts, technology transfer and compatible European industrial policies.
In a more competitive and conditional geopolitical environment, Romania can no longer rely on the security determined by the assumption of continuity of external supply at peak consumption when it is in deficit. Energy and energy technology become criteria for effective sovereignty. The difference between stability and vulnerability will not be given by discourse, but by the capacity to maintain the functioning of countries at peak consumption and in crisis, through production, networks, storage, governance and controllable technological chains. If these capacities are not built, Romania remains either in the gray area or exposed to a systemic crisis; if they are built, energy goes from a problem to an instrument of power.
